The issue, therefore, is not that we need to stop representation from benefiting elite minorities—that’s just representation in its most indefensible form—but that we need to stop believing that representation, or, more broadly conceived, anti-discrimination, should be our foremost social justice commitment. Without a prior grounding in a politics of economic equality, all anti-discrimination boils down to is the neoliberal promise that people should have an equal opportunity to escape poverty; rather than trying to get rid of it.

At a crucial juncture in her reconstruction of Marx’s account, Kornbluh claims that “labor makes things useful, while exchange and its hypostasis in the concept of value and the medium of money is the activity that generates value qua value.” But this neglects Marx’s distinction between abstract and concrete labor, or labor as productive of value and labor as productive of objects of use. Contrary to Kornbluh, value is not “generated” by exchange but rather by the expenditure of labor time and realized through exchange. So long as value—labor time—is the measure of social wealth, workers must expend abstract labor in exchange for a wage, while the capitalist appropriates the products the worker has valorized. This implies that the form of distribution—the propertylessness of the worker—is grounded in the form of production itself.

That disaster followed in 1947 when Republicans, who won majorities in both houses of Congress in the 1946 election, passed the Taft-Hartley amendment to the Wagner Act, which placed a raft of restrictions on labor unions, opened the door for right-to-work laws, and required all union officers to sign affidavits confirming that they were not members of the Communist Party. The latter caused the biggest problem for FTA since all its national officers were Communists. This opened the door for more conservative unions in the AFL and the CIO to launch membership raids on FTA locals, often with the support of employers.

The New Deal marked a fundamental recognition by the United States government that farmers were unable to earn a living without significant regulatory changes to commodity markets. Rural poverty and the threat of social unrest compelled federal intervention into agricultural capitalism. Agrarian reform during the Great Depression sought to address the impoverishment of farmlands and farmworkers. New Deal policies from the 1930s aimed to influence commodity markets by curbing crop surplus.

For Agee and Evans, the task would be to render into art the dialectical oppositions I have argued were central to their enterprises: between the boots as things and the boots as elements of a productive enterprise or between money as the power to effect the crossing between producer and consumer and money as the obverse face of obdurate debt.

Literary works imagined houses that were tied to small-scaled, personally directed labor. In fictional works of the twenties and thirties, a distinctive idealism emerged amid the archaic house, which would be linked with the self-determination the homesteader, factory owner, and the creative writer. If much of the New Deal entailed a “demand for organization, administration, and management from a central focus,” the personal labors characteristic of the little house appear as focused, discretionary, and most of all pleasurable, in part because this work was invisible as labor.